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The New California Exemptions in
Bankruptcy: A Constitutional Reprise
BY GARY NEUSTADER*
California's new law on the enforcement of judgments, effective July
1, 1983, included significant changes in the type and amount of prop-
erty that a judgment debtor or a judgment debtor and spouse may ex-
empt from enforcement of a money judgment.' These changes in
exemption law are vitally important to the attorney who offers insol-
vency counseling because the Bankruptcy Code permits, and many
states require, that a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding rely on state
exemption law to exempt property from the reach of the bankruptcy
trustee.2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the assistance of Jacquie Ellenberger in the preparation of this article.
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§680.010-724.260 (Enforcement of Judgments Law). The En-
forcement of Judgments Law replaces the existing Title 9 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure with a new Title 9. The law was engineered by the California Law Revision Commission.
See CAL. L. REv. COMM'N, Tentative Recommendation Proposing the Enforcement of Judgments
Law, 15 CAL. L. Rav. CCOM'N REPORTS 2001 (1980). The Commission, in cooperation with Cali-
fornia Continuing Education of the Bar, has published a convenient and thorough reference
source which includes the full text of the law, a Summary of the Commission's Recommendation,
the full text of the Commission's Recommendation, and official comments to the text of each
section of the statute. CAL. L. REv. COMM'N, 1982 Creditors' Remedies Legislation, 16 CAL. L.
REV. COMM'N REPORTS 1001 (1982). [hereinafter referred to as Creditors' Remedies Legislation].
The exemption provisions are located in Chapter 4 of Division 2 of the new Title 9, beginning
with section 703.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That chapter commences with an article of
general provisions, and continues with articles describing the procedure for claiming an exemp-
tion from execution, the type and amount of personal property which may be exempted, and the
exemption of property used as a principal dwelling. Then follows a separate chapter governing
wage garnishment. Id.
2. 11 U.S.C. §522(b) (Supp. V 1981). A choice of state exemptions will also determine the
extent to which a debtor may avoid the fixing of certain liens which impair an exemption to which
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The new California exemption law may preserve to debtors in bank-
ruptcy the existing option of electing the exemptions listed in section
522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code-the "federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions".3 Moreover, the new exemption law will not alter the practical
rule of thumb that the California debtor with significant equity in prop-
erty used as a principal dwelling should usually choose the California
exemptions, while the debtor who rents living accommodations should
usually choose the federal bankruptcy exemptions.4 The new exemp-
tion provisions, however, affect pre-petition insolvency counseling and
planning for individuals in significant ways.
This article will address only those exemption provisions in the new
law that raise significant constitutional issues: a provision prohibiting
exemption stacking; a provision that possibly precludes the choice of
federal bankruptcy exemptions; and a provision applying the new ex-
emptions retroactively. This author leaves to a later day, or to others,
comment on additional changes in the new exemption law having im-
portant implications for insolvency counseling of individuals.'
EXEMPTION STACKING AND OPT OUT
One of the most significant questions generated by section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code has been whether a husband and wife can split their
the debtor would otherwise be entitled. Id. §522(0 (Supp. V 1981). A claim of state exemptions
will also fix the statutory minimum of property to be distributed on account of allowed unsecured
claims in a Chapter 13 plan. Id. §1325(a) (4) (Supp. V 1981). That minimum can be determined
only by knowing the value of the debtor's estate which could be liquidated under Chapter 7,
which in turn can only be known after ascertaining the property which the debtor could exempt in
a Chapter 7 proceeding. Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code actually permits the debtor to
exempt property which is exempt under state or local law and property which is exempt under
non-bankruptcy federal law. Id. §522(b) (Supp. V 1981). For convenience, the author sometimes
use the phrases "state exemptions" or "state exemption law" as a convention to refer to both in the
context of section 522(b).
3. A debtor may not select the federal bankruptcy exemptions listed in section 522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code if the state in which the debtor has filed a petition has opted out of those exemp-
tions by appropriate legislation. 11 U.S.C. §522(b) (Supp. V 1981). Whether California has opted
out is the subject of ensuing discussion in the text.
4. California law continues to protect a maximum of $45,000 equity in property used as a
principal dwelling. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §704.730. The federal bankruptcy exemptions protect
a maximum of $7,900 equity for an individual judgment debtor or $15,800 equity for married
judgment debtors. 11 U.S.C. §§522(d)(1), (5), 522(m) (Supp. V 1981). For those who rent, the
$7,900 or $15,800 may be applied to any property whatsoever, in addition to property exempt
under other subsections of section 522(d), For a further discussion of the rule of thumb, see gener-
ally Neustadter, Consumer Insolyency Counselingfor Californians in the 1980's, 19 SANTA CLARA
L. RaV. 817, 856-63 (1979). [hereinafter referred to as Neustader].
5. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §704.020 (an alteration of the household furnishings exemp-
tion to preclude reliance upon the debtor's station-in-life); Id. §704.070 (substitution of a paid
earnings deposit account exemption for the exemption of funds in a savings and loan association
or credit union); Id. §§704.100, 704.110 (alteration of exemptions for life insurance policies, loan
values, and benefits, and for private retirement benefits); Id. §§704.140, 704.150 (new exemptions
for damages for personal injury or wrongful death); and Id. §704.730(b) (a $45,000 limit to the
homestead exemption regardless of whether the homestead consists of community property or
separate property or both).
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choice of exemptions in a joint case.6 Specifically, the question is
whether one spouse in a joint case may choose the exemptions allowed
under state and nonbankruptcy federal law to protect some property,
while the other spouse chooses the federal bankruptcy exemptions to
protect more of the same property or other kinds of property.' This
practice, sometimes referred to as "exemption stacking," has been sus-
tained in recent bankruptcy cases on the basis of section 522(m). The
section provides that ". . .section 522 shall apply separately with re-
spect to each debtor in a joint case."'
Exemption stacking is, of course, not possible in the many states that
have opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions.9 Moreover, the
possibility of exemption stacking in states that have not opted out may
be eliminated by Congress. Congress has proposed to eliminate federal
bankruptcy exemptions entirely and to permit debtors to exempt only
property protected under state law or nonbankruptcy federal law from
enforcement of a money judgment. This proposal essentially would re-
vert to the exemption law policy of the Bankruptcy Act.' 0 In other
6. A joint case is authorized by section 302 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §302 (Supp.
V 1981).
7. To illustrate, suppose that husband and wife living in California file a joint petition under
Chapter 7. They hold, as community property, real property used by them as their principal
residence. The real property is valued at approximately $150,000, but the property is encumbered
by deeds of trust securing notes in the total amount of $100,000. Accordingly, the debtor's equity
in the real property is approximately $50,000. Were both debtors to choose the California exemp-
tions, they would be able to protect a maximum of $45,000 of equity in their home (issues of
retroactivity aside). CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §704.730. Were both to choose the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions, they would be able to protect a maximum of $15,800 of equity in their home
(each claiming $7,900 exempt under subsections 522(d)(1), (5)). In either case, absent a negotiated
settlement with the trustee, the debtors would face the prospect of losing their home through
forced sale, subject to their receiving the amount of the exemption from the proceeds of the sale.
To avoid that possibility, one spouse could claim the California exemptions (protecting $45,000 in
equity) and the other spouse could claim (and thus "stack") the federal bankruptcy exemptions
(including $7,900 in any property), thus protecting the remaining $5,000 in equity. This practice
has been sanctioned by Bankruptcy Appellate Panels in the Ninth Circuit. In re Emmerich, 19
Bankr. 666, 667 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Ageton, 14 Bankr. 833, 837 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981).
The decisions from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panels preceded, and hence did not
consider, the exemption stacking prohibition discussed later in the text. Comment, The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1979: An Exemption Windfallfor Joint Debtors?, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 80, 95-
96 (1982) (per a discussion of conflicting decisions which preceded the decisions of the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panels). The author has argued previously that this practice abuses
the spirit of both the California exemptions and the federal bankruptcy exemptions because the
protection in California for real property used as a principal residence is intended to provide
protection to a family unit. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§704.730(a)(2)(B), 704.710(b). To allow
one spouse in that unit to claim California's exemption for the principal residence and to allow the
other spouse in that unit to "stack" additional protection from section 522(d) on top of the state
exemption is clearly giving to the debtors more than either the California Legislature or the Con-
gress ever contemplated. Neustadter, supra note 4, at 865-66. Nonetheless, courts have sustained
the practice on the basis of the allegedly plain meaning of the language in section 522(m) of the
Bankruptcy Code. I 1 U.S.C. §522(m) (Supp. V 1981).
8. 11 U.S.C. §522(m) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 7.
9. To date 35 states have opted out. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY, §522.02, n.4a at 522-
31 (15th Ed. 1983).
10. H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §8 (1981).
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bills, Congress simply has proposed to amend section 522(m) to require
that both spouses in a joint case elect the same set of exemptions.'" If
Congress, however, fails to amend the Bankruptcy Code in these or
comparable ways, the issue posed by exemption stacking will command
attention for some time.
The issue is unresolved in California because provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure purport to eliminate exemption stacking as a matter
of state law. In 1981, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill
1857, which amending section 6980 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
prohibit exemption stacking. 2 This provision was quickly declared
unconstitutional by judges in California bankruptcy courts on the
ground that it conflicted with section 522(m) of the Bankruptcy Code
and thereby violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. 1 Those judicial decisions have not ended the matter, how-
ever, because the prohibition is renewed in the new Enforcement of
Judgments Law.
New section 703.130 of the Code of Civil Procedure also prohibits
exemption stacking. 4 Subdivision (a) of section 703.130 flatly states
11. H.R. 1147, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. §5 (1983); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §208(a) (1), (2)
(1983); S. 333, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §5 (1983); H.R. 7349, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. §304(c) (1983); S.
2000, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. §8(a)(1), (2) (1983); S. 992, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §1 (1981).
12. The amendment redesignated former subsection (b) as subsection (c) and added a new
subsection (b) reading as follows:
(b) Pursuant to the authority of paragraph (I) of subsection (b) of Section 522 of Title
11 of the United States Code, the exemptions set forth in subsection (d) of Section 522 of
Title 11 of the United States Code are authorized in this state as follows:
(1) When a husband and wife are joined in a petition filed under Title 11 of the United
States Code, they jointly may elect to utilize the applicable exemption provisions under
this chapter or under subsection (b) of section 522 of Title 11 of the United States Code,
but not both.
(2) When a petition under Title 11 of the United States Code is filed individually, and
not jointly, for a husband or a wife, one spouse shall not claim any exemption under this
chapter if the other spouse has claimed any exemption under subsection (b) of section
522 of Title I 1 of the United States Code, and one spouse shall not claim any exemption
under Title 11 of the United States Code if the other spouse claimed any exemption
under this chapter.
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODF §690(b) (repealed as of July 1, 1983).
13. In re Stacey, 24 Bankr. 97, 98-99 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Lee, 22 Bankr. 977, 979
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Hopkins unreported (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982) (order on file with
author).
14. The section reads as follows:
(a) Pursuant to the authority of paragraph (I) of subsection (b) of Section 522 of Title
I 1 of the United States Code, the exemptions set forth in subsection (d) of Section 522 of
Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy) are not authorized in this state.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if a husband and wife are joined in a petition
filed under Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy), they jointly may elect to
utilize the applicable exemption provisions under this chapter or to utilize the applicable
exemptions set forth in subsection (d) of Section 522 of Title I 1 of the United States
Code, but not both.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if a petition under Title 11 of the United States
Code (Bankruptcy) is filed individually, and not jointly, for a husband or a wife, the
exemptions set forth in subsection (d) of Section 522 of Title I 1 of the United States
Code are authorized in this state if the husband and.wife each effectively waive in writ-
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that California opts out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, thus ex-
ercising the opt out authority granted under section 522(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The remaining subdivisions of section 703.130 then
return to debtors almost all of what subdivision (a) appears to have
taken from them. Subdivision (b) allows spouses in a joint case to exer-
cise either the California exemptions or the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions if, and only if, each spouse chooses the same set of exemptions.
Subdivision (c) allows a husband or wife in any bankruptcy case com-
menced by one of them to choose the federal bankruptcy exemptions
on condition that the nonpetitioning spouse executes a written waiver
of his or her right to claim the California exemptions in a case filed
while the case of the previously petitioning spouse is still pending.
Subdivision (d) permits an unmarried person to choose the federal
bankruptcy exemptions.
Thus, although written and structured differently than its progenitor,
section 690(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the net effect of section
703.130 is only to prohibit exemption stacking, not to opt out of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions. The staff of the California Law Revi-
sion Commission, drafters of the section, believed that the revised form
in which the prohibition on exemption stacking was drafted would
likely be held constitutional,1 5 but decisions concerning section 690(b)
now make this view appear to have been unduly optimistic. Because
the substance, though not the form, of section 703.130 is identical to the
ing the right to claim, during the period the case commenced by; filing such petition is
pending, the exemptions provided by the applicable exemption provisions of this chapter
in any case by filing a petition for either of them under Title 11 of the United States
Code.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if a petition is filed under Title 11 of the United
States Code (Bankrputcy) for an unmarried person, the unmarried person may elect to
utilize the applicable exemption provisions under this chapter or to utilize the applicable
exemptions set forth in subsections (d) of Section 522 of Title 11 of the United States
Code, but not both."
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §703.130.
15. The staff of the California Law Revision Commission first proposed section 703.130 in its
First Supplement to Memorandum 81-91, dated October 8, 1981, (copy on file with author or
available from the Commission), in response to the chaptering of Assembly Bill 1857 in Septem-
ber, 1981. 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. Chap. 455. After 1857 was chaptered, the Commission decided
to continue the substance of 1857 in the new, comprehensive enforcement ofjudgments law rather
than to abandon the prohibition on exemption stacking. The staff recognized that "if subdivisions
(b) and (c) were held unconstitutional, subdivision (a) would preclude the claiming of the federal
exemptions, but the staffs view was that it was much more likely that a court would uphold the
enitre section-including subdivisions (b) and (c)-as a reasonable solution to a difficult prob-
lem." Letter from John H. DeMoully, Executive Secretary of the Commission, to the author
(April 6, 1983). Presumably the reasoning supporting this view is roughly as follows: Congress
permitted states to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions in favor of state created exemp-
tions; because section 703.130(a) opts out, the state is free to create whatever exemptions it wishes
for debtors who petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, including a scheme which prohib-
its exemption stacking. This reasoning seems flawed because it fails to consider the conflict be-
tween such a prohibition and the language of section 522(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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substance of section 690(b), this new prohibition on exemption stacking
likely suffers the same constitutional infirmity.
Nonetheless, subdivision (a) of section 703.130 might well survive
the constitutional attack because of the power of the courts to sever the
unconstitutional portions of a statute. 16 Subdivision (a) certainly could
stand alone grammatically. 17 Were subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) to be
severed from section 703.130, subdivision (a) would then express a de-
termination by the California Legislature to opt out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions. Indeed, the legislative committee comment to
section 703.130 asserts that subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) are severable
from subdivision (a).18 The courts are inclined to look to the intent of
the legislature in enacting a statute when deciding whether severance is
appropriate,1 9 and the legislative committee comment is a weighty indi-
cation of legislative intent.
20
Nevertheless, severance could possibly be held improper and the en-
tire section ruled unconstitutional. This possibility rests upon conflict-
ing messages indicating the intent of the legislature. In March, 1981,
Assemblyman Lancaster introduced Assembly Bill 1857.21 The origi-
nal bill provided for California to opt out of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions. Because the bill was introduced for the purpose of prohib-
iting exemption stacking,2 2 however, Assembly Bill 1857 was amended
in the Assembly to substitute a prohibition on exemption stacking for
the opt out provision. The amended bill was enacted but, as previously
noted, its provisions were later declared unconstitutional. 23
It is illogical to conclude that the legislature intended to resurrect the
opt out proposal of the original Assembly Bill 1857 by enacting section
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §681.050. Section 681.050 of the Code of Civil Procedure, added
by the new law, authorizes severance. It recites the standard litany that invalid provisions shall
not affect other provisions which can be given effect without the invalid provision. Id.
17. [I]n considering the issue of severability, it must be recognized that the general pre-
sumption of constitutionality, fortified by the express statement of a severability clause,
normally calls for sustaining any valid portion of a statute unconstitutional in part. This
is possible and proper where the language of the statute is mechanically severable, that is,
where the valid and invalidparts can be separated byparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or
even single words. (emphasis added). In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 655, 184 P.2d 892, 900
(1947).
18. "Subdivision (b), (c) and (d) of Section 703.130 are severable from subdivision (a), and
the invalidity of any or all of these subdivisions does not affect the rule stated in subdivision (a).
See Section 681.050." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §703.030 (Legis. Comm. Comment-Assembly).
19. See, e.g., People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 261, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137, 145-46 (1974).
20. See Comment, The Use of Extrinsicl ids in Determining Legislative Intent in California:
The Needfor Standardized Criteria, 12 PAC. LJ. 189, 202, 204 (1980).
21. The bill emanated from the California Bankers' Association and was supported by the
California Association of Collectors, the California Credit Union League, the California Savings
and Loan League, and the California Retailers Association. (legislative history is on file with
author).
22. Legislative history on file with author.
23. See cases cited supra note 13.
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703.130 when the ostensible purpose of this section was simply to re-
draft the exemption stacking prohibition in a way that likely would be
held constitutional.24 Of course, the same legislature that rejected an
opt out provision in 1981 could favor the provision in the following
year.25 A more reasonable assumption, however, is that most legislators
did not notice the opt out issue since it was buried in a bill of massive
length and complexity, obscured by the more notable goals and provi-
sions of the bill.26 The possibility of opt out, likely did not receive
meaningful consideration on the merits.
In addition, the section 703.130 itself implicitly reflects an intention
that residents of California be permitted to choose the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions. Subdivision (b) provides that spouses may jointly
elect the federal exemptions; subdivision (c) states that one spouse may
elect the federal exemptions if the other spouse waives the right to
claim the California exemptions in a petition subsequently filed; and
subdivision (d) provides that all unmarried persons may elect the fed-
eral bankruptcy exemptions. A more ringing endorsement of the op-
tion to choose the federal bankruptcy exemptions can hardly be
imagined. The conundrum, of course, is that subdivision (a) states just
the opposite.
The seemingly inconsistent messages of section 703.130 can be ex-
plained by the view of the Law Revision Commission staff that the
format of section 703.130 was the best way to circumvent the constitu-
tional problem.27 Alternatively, the drafting of the section can be un-
derstood by concluding that the legislature desired to opt out of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions if the more modest goal of prohibiting
exemption stacking could not constitutionally be achieved. This con-
clusion assumes, however, that the legislature was willing to "throw out
the baby with the bath water," because the abuses stemming from ex-
emption stacking are minimal compared to the benefits enjoyed by a
significant portion of California residents by virture of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions.
Most notably, sections 522(d)(1) and 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. 1981 and 1983 were in the same legislative session and bills introduced in each year were
thus considered by the same legislators.
26. The Enforcement of Judgments Law consists of almost 500 separate sections and con-
sumes 267 pages in the Code of Civil Procedure. The new law was intended to "provide a full and
clear statutory treatment of the law governing enforcement ofjudgments." CAL. L. REV. COMM'N,
Creditors'Remedies Legislation, supra note I, at 1029. It would be surprising if more than a hand-
ful of legislators were aware of the issues prosed by section 703.130. Only the cognoscente wouldrecognize the possibility that a comprehensive law affecting enforcement ofjudgments in the state
remedies system might conceal a blockbuster provision affecting the rights of debtors in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Code provide renters with a measure of parity with homeowners.
Those federal bankruptcy exemptions permit a debtor to exempt $7,900
in value of any property to the extent not claimed for a homestead or
burial plot. No comparable exemption exists under California law, but
California law does afford a generous homestead exemption. Thus, an
opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions will renew the discrimi-
nation against renters that inheres in the California exemption provi-
sions. This result would be inconsistent with other action taken by the
California Legislature to respond of the needs of renters.28
Given these conflicting messages concerning legislative intent, a
court may justifiably conclude that subdivision (a) of section 703.130
cannot stand severed from its unconstitutional companions. This hold-
ing would return the issue to the legislature where it could be raised
and clearly considered on the merits. Notably, the legislature and the
financial institutions which might support opt out could consider recent
studies concluding that the availability of federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions does not increase the rate of consumer bankruptcy filings.
29
In the event that a court decides that severance is appropriate,
notwithstanding the arguments just advanced, section 703.130(a),
standing alone, may still be unconstitutional. Bankruptcy judges else-
where have held opt out legislation to be unconstitutional.3" The con-
stitutional argument advanced in these cases, detailed more fully
elsewhere,31 is based upon the premise that the opt out authority is a
congressional delegation of federal power that may be exercised only
within defined limits. The limits implicit in the Bankruptcy Code re-
quire that exemptions provide debtors with a fresh start. If a state's
exemption law fails to afford residents of the state a fresh start analo-
gous to that afforded by the federal bankruptcy exemptions, opt out
legislation in that state is arguably unconstitutional because it fails to
exercise the delegated authority in the manner circumscribed by Con-
gress. This argument may be directed at subdivision (a) of section
703.130 because the California exemptions fail to afford nonhomeown-
28. See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §1950.5 (renters' rights concerning security for a rental agree-
ment); CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §17053.5 (tax credit for qualifying renters); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§50735-50770 (rental housing construction program).
29. Woodward and Woodward, Exemptions As An Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy.- An
Empirical Study, 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 53, 64 (Winter 1983); Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out,
and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHio ST. L. J. 335, 360-63 (1982).
30. In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780, 783 (Bankr. N.D. IUl. 1982); In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr.
629, 634-36 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981). Compare withIn re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1132-35 (7th
Cir. 1983). Id.
31. Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 373-
74 (1982); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of the Federal "Opt Out"
Provision Is Constitutional, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 65, 70-71 (1981).
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ers a fresh start analogous to that given to them by the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions.
Section 703.130 also raises important implications that present diffi-
culties for the counseling of clients. The attorney advising an unmar-
ried client may safely conclude that the federal bankruptcy exemptions
are available to exempt property from the client's estate unless and un-
til a bankruptcy court rules that only subdivision (a) is constitutional.
The attorney counseling the married couple whose property may be
entirely exempted without the benefit of exemption stacking, through a
joint election of either the California exemptions or the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions, may reach the same conclusion. However, when
the property of a married couple may not entirely be exempted without
the benefit of exemption stacking, the clients must be advised that if
they stack exemptions, they risk a ruling that will deny them the bene-
fits of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. The couple may be denied
benefits either because section 703.130 is constitutional, thus prohibit-
ing stacking, or because only subdivision (a) of section 703.130 is con-
stitutional, thus opting out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. If
the entire section is unconstitutional, the exemption stacking will suc-
ceed. One hopes that the clients who are offered as sacrifice for a deci-
sion on this issue will have been adequately informed of the risks, and
that a decision to end the uncertainty soon will be forthcoming.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF EXEMPTIONS
The assault on section 703.130 is not the only constitutional battle
invited by the new California exemption provisions are also subject to
another constitutional attack. 32 Section 703.050 applies the new ex-
emption provisions to judgments based on tort, contract or other legal
theory, whether those claims arose prior to or after July 1, 1983.33 Sec-
tion 703.060 reserves the right of the legislature to make retroactive
changes in the future.34 In the bankruptcy context, when a debtor
32. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§703.050, 703.060.
33. The statement in the text is an over simplification. Section 703.050(a) provides that the
determination whether property is exempt, or the amount of the exemption, shall be made by
applying the exemption statutes in effect at the earliest time the judgment creditor obtains a lien
on the property in question. Thus, for example, if a judgment creditor has levied a writ of execu-
tion on property prior to July 1, 1983, the property will be exempt to the extent provided in
exemption statutes in effect on the date of the levy (assuming no prior lien) because that is when
an execution lien is created. Id. §703.050. This raises a further problem which is not pursued in
the text. Suppose a creditor obtained a lien but the lien is later avoided in bankruptcy as a prefer-
ence. May the creditor who obtained the lien which has been avoided nonetheless claim that
exemptions in effect at the time the lien was obtained are to be applied in a bankruptcy proceeding
commenced after the date of a change in the exemption law?
34. Section 703.060 is worthy of reproduction here in its entirety:
(a) The legislature finds and declares that generally persons who enter into contracts
do not do so in reliance on an assumption that the exemptions in effect at the time of the
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chooses to exercise the California exemptions, these sections would ap-
pear to allow the debtor to exempt property in accordance with the
California exemption law in effect on the day of the filing of the peti-
tion, notwithstanding the existence of contract creditors who extended
credit prior to the effective date of a change in the exemption law. The
constitutional problem attending such a result has been discussed else-
where,35 but it appears useful to sketch and supplement that discussion
in preparation for the forthcoming attack on these sections.
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v.
Kearzey, 36 retroactive application of changes in exemption laws as ap-
plied to unsecured contract creditors has tripped on the Contract
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.37 The Edwards Court, in an execution
context, the Court held that action taken by North Carolina in 1868,
increasing the amount of the homestead exemption from $500 to $ 1000,
could not constitutionally be applied to a contract creditor who ex-
tended credit prior to the enactment of the statute because the statute
would thereby impair the creditor's contract rights. Notably, the court
commented that material or substantial impairments were con-
demned,38 thus leaving open the possibility that less drastic changes in
an exemption statute might not impair the obligation of contract.
More than 100 years later, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
31 the United States Supreme Court reviewed its decisions under the
contract will govern enforcement of any judgment based on the contract, that liens im-
posed on property are imposed not as a matter of right but as a matter of privilege
granted by statute for purposes of priority, that no vested rights with respect to exemp-
tions are created by the making of a contract or imposition of a lien, that application of
exemptions and exemption procedures in effect at the time of enforcement of a judgment
is essential to the proper balance between the rights of judgment debtors and judgment
creditors and has a minimal effect on the economic stability essential for the mainte-
nance of private and public faith in commercial matters, and that it is the policy of the
state to treat all judgment debtors equally with respect to exemptions and exemption
procedures in effect at the time of enforcement of a money judgment. To this end, the
Legislature reserves the right to repeal, alter, or add to the exemptions and the proce-
dures therefor at any time and intends, unless otherwise provided by statute, that any
repeals, alterations, or additions apply upon their operative date to enforcement of all
money judgments, whether based upon tort, contract, or other legal theory or cause of
action that arose before or after the operative date of the repeals, alterations, or addi-
tions, whether the judgment was entered before or after the operative date of the repeals,
alterations, or additions.
(b) All contracts shall be deemed to have been made and all liens on property shall be
deemed to have been created in recognition of the power of the state to repeal, alter, and
add to statutes providing for liens and exemptions from the enforcement of money
judgments.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §703.060.
35. See, e.g., Comment, The Contract Clause and the Constitutionality ofRetroactive Applica.
lion of Exemption Statutes.- 4 Reconsideration, 9 PAC. L.J. 889 (1978).
36. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877).
37. U.S. CONsT., art. 1, §10, cl. 1 ("No State shall. . .make any. . .Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts. ... ).
38. Edwards, 96 U.S. at 601, 603 (1877).
39. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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contract clause and held a Minnesota law imposing new pension fund-
ing charges unconstitutional as an impairment of a pre-existing con-
tract between an employer and its employees. In language reminiscent
of the concern for substantiality expressed in Edwards, the court stated:
. . .the first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, oper-
ated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. The
severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations
may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the
other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the
nature and purpose of the state legislation.
4
0
Later, the court explained that the inquiry into the nature and purpose
of state legislation when the impairment is substantial may lead to the
conclusion that the legislation is nonetheless constitutional if the legis-
lation is addressed to a broad, generalized economic or social problem
in an area already subject to state regulation.41
Neither of these cases, nor any other United States Supreme Court
decision, has considered whether retroactive application of changes in
state exemption law to unsecured contract creditors in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding runs afoul of the Contract Clause.42 An obvious but appar-
ently novel proposition is therefore advanced by this author: in the
bankruptcy exemption context the Contract Clause is simply irrelevant,
even when the debtor chooses to exempt property that is exempt under
state or local law because the exemptions afforded debtors in proceed-
ings under the Bankruptcy Code are exemptions granted by federal
law. Only the impairment of contract by state law is prohibited by the
Contract Clause.43
It is true, of course, that section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code refers to
state or local law in describing the exemptions that a debtor may
choose.' 'This choice, however, is authorized by federal law and is not
tantamount to an impairment of the obligations of contract by state
law. There is a difference between the retroactive application of
40. Id. at 244-45.
41. Id. at 250. The court here also suggests that the statute which substantially impairs con-
tractual obligations may be constitutional only if the impairment is temporary. Id.
42. Edwards, and W. B. Worthern Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934), come the closest by
considering retroactive application in the context of a state law preceeding for enforcement of a
money judgment. The other cases collected in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
234 (1978), are further from the mark.
43. "The bankruptcy power, like the other substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the
Fifth Amendment. Under the bankruptcy power Congress may discharge the debtor's personal
obligation, because, unlike the States, it is not prohibited from impairing the obligation of con-
tracts .. " Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589-90 (1935). In the
Radford case the Supreme Court found the retroactive impairment of lien rights in bankruptcy to
be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
44. 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
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changes in exemption law in the context of a state law proceeding for
the enforcement of a judgment, and the retroactive application of
changes in exemption law in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.
In the former, a problem of impairment of contract by state law truly
does exist. In the latter, the impairment arises solely by virtue of the
congressional exercise of the bankruptcy power. Retroactive applica-
tion of exemptions in bankruptcy should no more be subject to the
Contract Clause than are the provisions affording the debtor a dis-
charge from debt. 41
A harmonious reading of the language in section 522(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code supports this conclusion. Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows a
debtor to choose property that is exempt under state or local law and
under nonbankruptcy federal law applicable on the date of the filing of
the petition.46 There is good reason to support the view that "applica-
ble" state or local law should not be taken to include state law concern-
ing the retroactive application of exemptions in the context of a
proceeding to enforce a judgment. Nonbankruptcy federal exemptions
that a debtor may choose in a bankruptcy proceeding are clearly not
subject to the constraints of the Contract Clause because these exemp-
tions are not state law. Similarly, the federal bankruptcy exemptions
that debtors in some states may choose are not subject to the constraints
of the Contract Clause because those exemptions are federal law. It
would be anomalous to conclude that the state or local law exemptions
that a debtor might choose could not be applied retroactively, but that
the nonbankruptcy federal exemptions or the federal bankruptcy ex-
emptions available to the same debtor may be applied retroactively. A
more reasonable interpretation is that the language in section 522(b)
reserves to the debtor the kinds and amounts of property that section
522(d), nonbankruptcy federal law, or state or local law identify as ex-
empt as of the date of the filing of the petition. This interpretation is
consistent with the principle that exemptions under state or local law
might not be retroactively applicable to contract creditors in the context
of an enforcement of judgment.
Opinions in bankruptcy cases have failed to discuss the proposition
advanced by this author. Rather, courts have assumed without ques-
tion that the Contract Clause was implicated in the bankruptcy deci-
sion because the Contract Clause is applicable to an analogous issue in
45. Id. §737, 524 (Supp. V 1981). Exemptions and discharge are the complementary princi-
ples of bankruptcy law essential to the goal of a fresh start for the debtor. Id.
46. 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). The exemption of certain deposits by members
of the armed forces is an example of a non-bankruptcy federal exemption. 10 U.S.C. §1035(d)
(1976).
1983 / Exemptions
the context of a state law proceeding for enforcement of a judgment.
That assumption seems unwarranted and should be challenged.
If the challenge fails, nevertheless there is still promise for debtors in
bankruptcy that changes in the exemption law may be applied retroac-
tively. Here too, however, the debtor must fight upstream, burdened by
the assumption questioned above that the Contract Clause applies in
the bankruptcy context. With one exception, the handful of reporteo
California bankruptcy decisions treating the issue since the decision of
the Supreme Court in Allied have failed to undertake the analysis
whichAllied compels.47 Instead, most of the California Bankruptcy de-
cisions have continued to follow the 1956 decision of the Ninth Circuit
in England v. Sanderson.48 Because England v. Sanderson did not antic-
ipate the refined analysis announced inAllied, continued reliance upon
it is misplaced.49
In the bankruptcy exemption context, only the Ninth Circuit opinion
in LaFortune v. Naval Weapons Center Federal Credit Union50 has ap-
plied the analysis required by,4llied. In that case, the court considered
whether the claimed residential exemption, effective as of July 1, 1975,
as an alternative to the declared homestead, could be applied retroac-
tively to affect the rights of a contract creditor who extended credit
prior to that date. The court concluded that the claimed residential
exemption was an entirely new exemption and thus substantially im-
paired the rights of pre-existing contract creditors. 5' The court also de-
cided that no demonstrable necessity for the legislation existed and
therefore the substantial impairment was not justified by a sufficient
47. Bassin v. Stopher, 637 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1981); Gill v. Halub, 25 Bankr. 617 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1982);Inre McDaniel, 13 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Skipwith, 9 Bankr.
730 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Murillo, 4 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Pappas, 2
Bankr. 138 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979) (Bankruptcy Act); In re Bonant, 1 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1979) (Bankruptcy Act). Several of these decisions rely on or cite to Swenor v. Robertson,
452 F. Supp. 673 (1978), decided before the Allied case.
48. 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956).
49. The opinion in England v. Sanderson dealt primarily with the mechanism by which the
trustee could assert the rights of creditors who extended credit prior to the increase in the amount
of an exemption. The court assumed, through footnote references to California Appellate Court
decisions rendered in the execution context, that changes in the amount of an exemption could not
be applied retroactively to pre-existing contract creditors in the bankruptcy context. Id. at 642,
n.2. Moreover, the California exemption at issue in the case did not even purport to make changes
in exempt amounts retroactive, unlike Section 703.050 of the new law. Thus, the constitutional
issue was not meaningfully explored.
50. 652 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 847. In this respect, the court's view coincided with Daylin Medical and Surgical
Supply, Inc. v. Thomas, 69 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 37, 138 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1977) and differed from San Diego White Truck Co. v. Swift, 96 Cal.App.3d 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1979). The court did not feel bound by the decision in San Diego White Truck Co. because the
issue concerned interpretation and application of a clause of the United States Constitution. 652
F.2d at 846.
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governmental interest.52
If the Contract Clause is relevant, the decisions inAllied and LaFor-
tune should be the point of departure for consideration of the constitu-
tionality of sections 703.050 and 703.060. Applied to these sections, the
Allied and LaFortune decisions suggest that retroactive application of
changes in exemption law to unsecured contract creditors may be con-
stitutional in some cases and unconstitutional in others.
The first question to ask is whether the change in an exemption has
substantially impaired the rights of any contract creditor whose claim is
listed in the debtor's petition. This question is difficult to answer be-
cause the term "substantial" is relative. The exact comparisons that
need to be made in the bankruptcy context to determine the substanti-
ality of an impairment are unclear. To date, the comparison, when
made, seems to have been between the amount of the new or increased
exemption and the amount of the old exemption, without considering
the impact of the change on a specific creditor.5 3 The simplicity of this
approach makes it appealing but, at least in the bankruptcy context,
this approach sidesteps the central issue of whether the rights of a spe-
cific creditor have been substantially impaired.
A more meaningful comparison in the bankruptcy context would be
between the dividend be paid to an unsecured creditor applying the
pre-existing exemption scheme and the dividend that would be paid to
that same creditor applying the new exemption scheme. To make this
comparison, one must understand how a trustee can reach and how a
trustee shall distribute property that is exempt as to some creditors, but
not exempt as to other creditors because a new or increased exemption
is not applied retroactively. That subject has an important history as
well as an uncertain future.54 In some bankruptcy cases in which im-
52. LaFortune v. Naval Weapons Center Federal Credit Union, 652 F.2d 842, 848 (9th Cir.
1981).
53. Id. (new exemption not retroactive); Eldridge v. Commercial Credit Corp., 22 Bankr.
218 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (increase in automobile exemption from $1,000 to $2,000 retroactive);
Curry v. Associates Financial Services, 5 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (increase in house-
hold goods exemption from $600 to $1,500 retroactive); In re Echavarren, 2 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1980) (increase in homestead from $10,000 to $25,000 not retroactive).
54. In Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1902), the United States Supreme Court
held that a creditor holding a promissory note in which the debtor waived the applicable home-
stead exemption could seek "a reasonable postponement of the discharge of a bankrupt, in order
to allow the institution in the state court of such proceedings as might be necessary to make
effective the rights possessed by the creditor." id. at 300. That holding was premised upon the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that exempt property never became property of the estate and
hence that the bankruptcy court had no power to administer property which was exempt from the
reach of the trustee. Upon the institution of such state court proceedings, the creditor could pre-
sumably satisfy as much of its claim as the equity in the debtor's homestead permitted. That
solution is not as satisfactory where there are several creditors who claim an impairment of con-
tract by a new or increased exemption. Relegating such creditors to state court proceedings would
reward those quickest to act to the detriment or exclusion of others, a result at odds with a purpose
of bankruptcy, to treat unsecured, non-priority creditors equally. Largely as a consequence, the
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pairment of contract has been assumed, the courts have directed that
the trustee is entitled to reach the amount of an increase in an exemp-
tion corresponding to the total of the claims held by impaired creditors.
The trustee shall then distribute that amount, together with the remain-
der of the estate, in accordance with the distribution provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code." When the provisions of the Code are followed, the
dividend received by an impaired, nonpriority, unsecured creditor will
depend upon the amount of equity in the property that is reached by
the trustee, the amount paid to any priority claims, and the total
amount of other unsecured claims.
To illustrate, suppose the following hypothetical cases. In a petition
filed in fall, 1983 an unmarried debtor claims the California exemp-
tions to protect $50,000 received in settlement of a personal injury
claim. The debtor lists three contract creditors who extended credit
prior to July 1, 1983, the effective date of a new exemption for a per-
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted the bankruptcy trustee to reach the amount of an in-
crease in an exemption and to include that amount in the estate for general distribution. England
v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956).
To circumvent the holding in Lockwood, the Ninth Circuit grounded the trustee's rights in
section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, §70(c), 30 Stat. 565, as
amended in 1950 and 1966 (repealed 1979). Whatever validity that analysis may have had under
the Bankruptcy Act, it no longer suffices to give the trustee rights under the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the rights of a creditor who, hypotheti-
cally, extends credit on the day of the filing of the petition and who, with respect to such credit,
obtains a lien on the day of the filing of the petition, whether or not such a creditor actually exists.
11 U.S.C. §544(a) (Supp. V 1981). A trustee asserting the rights of such a hypothetical lien-credi-
tor clearly cannot argue that contract rights have been impaired by a new or increased exemption
which became effective prior to the date of the filing of the petition.
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the rights of an actual creditor holding
an allowable unsecured claim to "avoid any transfer of an interest of a debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law." 11 U.S.C. §544(b)
(Supp. V 1981). The creation of a new exemption, or the increase in the amount of an exemption,
is neither an obligation incurred by the debtor nor a transfer by the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§101(41) (Supp. V. 1981) (definition of "transfer"). Accordingly, section 544(b) cannot subrogate
the trustee to the rights of any creditor who claims an impairment of contract by virtue of a
change in exemption law.
One court has, therefore, concluded that the trustee has no rights on behalf of creditors who
claim an impairment to reach property claimed as exempt but that creditors may take appropriate
action in the bankruptcy court to that end. In re Skipwith, 9 Bankr. 730 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
See also In re McDaniel, 133 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). Other courts have continued to
allow the trustee to reach some property claimed as exempt relying erroneously on some pre-Code
cases. Gill v. Halub, 25 Bankr. 617 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Murillo, 4 Bankr. 612 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1980).
It would seem simpler and more appropriate to ground the trustee's rights in the trustee's pow-
ers to collect and administer the estate upon concluding that an exemption not effective against all
creditors cannot fully remove property from the estate. Because section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code, unlike the Bankruptcy Act, initially includes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor,
including exempt property, in the estate (with exceptions not relevant here). 11 U.S.C. §541
(Supp. V. 1981). Lockwood v. Exchange Bank is not a bar to that conclusion.
55. Compare Swenor v. Robertson, 452 F.Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (amount of homestead
exemption is amended amount, $30,000, less total of claims of impaired creditors, but in no event
less than previous amount of homestead exemption, $20,000), with In re Pappas, 2 Bankr. 138
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (amount of homestead exemption is amount in effect prior to increase,
$20,000, plus any amount of the increase in the exemption, $10,000, which remains after allocating
additional equity to the trustee corresponding to the total of the claims of impaired creditors).
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sonal injury settlement. 56 The debtor can sustain the burden of showing
that all of the settlement proceeds are reasonably necessary for his sup-
port, a requirement for claim of the exemption. Each of the three cred-
itors is unsecured and without priority. Creditor A claims $2,000.
Creditor B claims $5,000. Creditor C claims $15,000. The total of all
unsecured claims scheduled is $125,000. There are no priority claims,
other than administrative expenses. All property of the debtor other
than the proceeds from the settlement are exempt without question. If
the exemption were not applied retroactively and the $22,000 of the
proceeds of the settlement (the total of the claims of Creditors A, B and
C) were distributed ratably among all unsecured claims, each would
receive something less than 18 cents on the dollar ($352 for Creditor A,
$880 for Creditor B and $2,640 for Creditor C).57
Suppose, instead, that the same debtor were seeking to exempt
$30,000 equity in a home rather than the proceeds of a personal injury
settlement. Each of the three creditors extended credit prior to the ef-
fective date of the amendment to the Civil Code that increased the
amount of the homestead exemption from $25,000 to $30,000 for per-
sons not the head of a household and not over the age of 65.58 All
property of the debtor, other than his home, is exempt without ques-
tion. In this case, each creditor would receive something less than 4
cents on the dollar if the $5,000 increase in the exemption were not
applied retroactively ($80 for Creditor A, $200 for Creditor B and $600
for Creditor C). The question then would be whether a difference be-
tween 18 cents on the dollar and no dividend in the first illustration, or
between 4 cents on the dollar and no dividend in the second illustration
would constitute a substantial impairment of the claim of each creditor.
Views may differ on the answer to that question, but it seems appropri-
ate to ask if the Contract Clause is relevant in the bankruptcy context
and if distribution is to be made in the manner suggested.59
This comparison between two postulated amounts of dividends is
56. The exemption is for causes of action, an award of damages, or a settlement arising out of
personal injury. An award of damages or settlement is exempt to the extent necessary for the
support of the judgment debtor and the spouse and dependents of the judgment debtor except as
against a provider of health care whose claim is based on the providing of health care for the
personal injury for which the award or settlement was made. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §704.140.
57. I assume that administrative expenses reduce the dividend somewhat.
58. CAL. CIV. CODE §1260, (repealed by Enforcement of Judgments Law, 1982 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Chap. 1364 (West), and superceded by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §704.730).
59. The notion that distribution should be made to all unsecured creditors even though only
the claims of a few unsecured creditors are impaired appears to spring from part of the holding in
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641, 644 (1956). The con-
clusion does not inevitably follow from Moore Y. Bay because that case involved the avoidance of
a fraudulent transfer. If distribution were made only to those creditors whose claims are im-
paired, the impairment will always be more substantial.
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somewhat complex.6" Accordingly, courts may be inclined to continue
to focus only upon the amount of increase in the exemption to deter-
mine whether an impairment of a contract creditor's claim is substan-
tial.6 ' Either approach to the issue of substantial impairment breeds
enormous uncertainty for those seeking to predict relevant outcomes
for clients. Further uncertainty arises from the principle that even sub-
stantial impairments may survive constitutional scrutiny when justified
by sufficient countervailing interests.62 Yet this is the path we seem
destined to travel if the courts persist in considering the Contract
Clause relevant in the bankruptcy exemption context. Surely, this is
not a path that the drafters of the Contract Clause or the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code would have us travel had they foreseen the journey.
The more sensible conclusion is that the Contract Clause does not hin-
der the choice of exemptions in bankruptcy, even when that choice is
made by applying a statute that may impair the obligation of contract
in the context of enforcement of a judgment.
CONCLUSION
The tension between federal and state power that is implicit in the
Federal Constitution and affected much of the drafting of the new
Bankruptcy Code is surfacing once again in California in 1983. The
language of section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code which apportioned
that power was shaped by last minute, hurried compromise, and thus,
was bound to leave the tension somewhat unresolved. This article sug-
gests a resolution of that tension in three areas of significant concern to
consumer debtors and their creditors.
The stacking of exemptions by spouses should not be permitted be-
60. Imagine the difficulties of calculation if elements of the two illustrations in the text were
present in one case.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. Language in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), for example,
leaves open to question whether retroactive application of increases in the amounts of exemptions,
even if substantially impairing contract rights, is nonetheless constitutional because the increase
protects debtors against the erosion of the value of their property by inflation or because it serves
some other important value. At one point the court speaks of justification for even substantial
impairment if the impairment is necessary "to meet an important general social problem." Id. at
247. Elsewhere the opinion refers to justification for substantial impairment based on broad and
desperate economic conditions. Id. at 249. The opinion then hastens to add that "[t]his is not to
suggest that only an emergency of great magnitude can constitutionally justify a state law impair-
ing the obligations of contracts." Id. at 249, n.24. Elsewhere the opinion hints that substantial
impairment may be justified only where the impairment is "a temporary alteration of the contrac-
tual relationships of those within its coverage." Id. at 250. In a case decided in its previous term,
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the court said that "an
impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose." Id. at 25. That language was echoed in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in LaFortune v.
Naval Weapons Center Federal Credit Union, 652 F.2d 842, 847-48 (1981). Drafting of section
703.060 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted in note 34 supra, was probably inspired by the
dicta in these and other cases.
Pacific Law Journal / Vo. 15
cause it abuses the spirit of both the federal bankruptcy exemption
scheme and the California exemption scheme. The prohibition of ex-
emption stacking must come, however, by amendment to section
522(m) of the Bankruptcy Code and not through the circuitous route
mapped in section 703.130 of the new California enforcement of judg-
ments law. A California opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions
ought to come, if at all, through legislation that is clearly identified for
that specific purpose. This legislation should squarely address the
problem of discrimination between homeowners and nonhomeowners
that is implicit in the California exemption law. Opt out should not
come silently and unobtrusively through the back door of section
703.130. Finally, courts should rid themselves of the nuisance and un-
certainty generated by the unnecessary application of the Contract
Clause to the question of the amount of exemptions available to debt-
ors seeking relief under the federal bankruptcy law. Retroactive appli-
cation of changes in exemption law to creditors of these debtors will
scarcely cause a ripple in consumer credit markets and will do no vio-
lence to entrenched constitutional principles.
